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The administration of Donald J. Trump has repeatedly
claimed that reciprocity is required for "fair"trade. While this
concept is not new in US political discourse, the Trump
administration'sinsistence that strict or absolute reciprocity is
required goes beyond any claims made by previous US
administrations.By strict reciprocity, the United States means
that all trade volumes and terms and conditions of trade must be
mirror images of each other. As the United States has a trade
deficit with all of its largest trading partners, the Trump
administrationclaims that this is evidence of unfairness in trade
harmingthe United States. Since countrieslike China have tariff
rates (25 percent) for a particularimport, such as automobiles,
that are significantly higher than US tariff rates (2.5 percent)for
imported automobiles, this is also evidence of unfair trade that
adds to the US trade deficit. Based on this lack of strict
reciprocity, the United States claims that trade with many of its
partners is unfair and has imposed punitive trade sanctions to
correct the imbalance.
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This Article demonstrates that not only is strict reciprocity
impossible to achieve in practice, but it is based on a critical
misunderstanding of elementary economic concepts. Since the
Trump administration has not proven its case that the lack of
strict reciprocity is evidence of unfair trade, the United States
must either find an alternative justification or withdraw the
sanctions.
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1. INTRODUCTION

The election of Donald J. Trump to the US presidency has led to
the revival of economic nationalism as the guiding policy of US
international trade relations. 1 Economic nationalism posits
international trade as a zero-sum game in which a gain in trade by one
nation must be accompanied by a corresponding trade loss to another
nation. 2 This modern expression of the political economic philosophy of

1.
See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, United States Unilateralismand the World
Trade Organization,B.U. INT'L L.J. 2 (forthcoming 2019) [hereinafter Unilateralism]
(on file with the Boston University International Law Journal). A favorite target of the
Trump administration trade policy is China, as discussed further in this Article. For a
specific examination of the Trump administration's China trade policies, see generally
Daniel C.K. Chow, William McGuire & Ian Sheldon, A Legal and Economic Critique of
China's Trade Policies, 79 U. PIw. L. REV. 39 (2017).
2.
See Unilateralism,supra note 1.
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mercantilism 3 (i.e., that a nation should increase its exports and
decrease its imports) was the basis on which the Trump administration
was able to win significant political support. 4 Trump incited
dissatisfied voters by claiming that the United States has too often
been the loser in a zero-sum game and that it will dictate the terms of
all new trade agreements to ensure that the United States is the
winner in trade deals at the expense of its trading partners, if
necessary. 5 As for existing trade agreements that compromise US
interests, the United States will impose wide-ranging punitive tariffs
(i.e., customs duties on imports) 6 on its trading partners to force them
to come to the table and to concede to new terms.7 The aggressiveness
of the US position has shocked and antagonized other nations that
have responded with threats of retaliation.8 Friendly trading nations
and allies of the United States seem genuinely shaken by US threats,
and the entire world economy seems to be bracing for a destructive
global trade war. 9

3.

See William R. Allen, Mercantilism, in THE NEW PALGRAvE DICTIONARY OF

ECONOMICS 445 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
4.
The policy idea that the solution to fixing the US economy is to increase
exports and decrease imports, a modern version of mercantilism, was set out in a key
trade policy paper. See generally PETER NAVARRO & WILBUR ROSS, SCORING THE TRUMP
ECONOMIC PLAN: TRADE, ENERGY, AND POLICY IMPACTS (2016), https://assets.

donaldjtrump.com/TrumpEconomicPlan.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2X6-74TX] (archived
Nov. 8, 2018). Imposing higher tariffs was part of this plan's strategy to decrease
imports. Id. at 2. This appealed to the many constituents in the Midwest who felt that
their jobs were threatened by imports from China and other countries. See Ben Popkin,
Betting the farm: Why the heartlandstill believes in Trump despiteplunging prices,
NBC NEWS (July 6, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.comfbusiness/economy/betting-farmwhy-heartland-still-believes-trump-despite-plunging-prices-n886941
[https://perma.cclH6CH-UW64] (archived Nov. 27, 2018). President Trump later
rewarded Navarro by appointing him to a key trade advisor role, and appointed Ross
Secretary of Commerce. Navarro and Ross continue to lead the Trump administration's
trade policies. See Doug Palmer, Ross confirmed to lead Commerce, POLITICO (Feb. 28,
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/ross-confirmed-to-lead-commerce-235469
[https://perma.cc/B77Q-BTT4] (archived Nov. 27, 2018).
See generally Unilateralism,supra note 1, at 2-3.
5.
See Tariffs, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/
6.
tariffs e/tariffse.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cclFP9R-2WTN]
(archived Nov. 27, 2018).
See generally Unilateralism,supra note 1, at 20-22.
7.
See, e.g., Melissa Edy & Chad Bray, EU Threatens to Retaliate with Tariffs
8.
on Bourbon and Bluejeans, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
03/02/business/europe-steel-tariffs-trump.html [https://perma.cc/4ZES-EJ7E] (archived
Nov. 8, 2018); Fred Imbert, China says it must retaliateagainst tariffs 'to defend the
nation's dignity,' CNBC (Aug. 2, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/china-says-itmust-retaliate-to-defend-nations-dignity.html [https://perma.cc/47WV-JMHM]
(archived Nov. 8, 2018).
9.
See Everything You Need to Know About the Trade War, BLOOMBERG
(updated June 29, 2018), https://www.bloombergquint.com/markets/shots-firedeverything-you-need-to-know-about-the-trade-war#gs.a_Z4Zxg [https://perma.cc/66ZT-
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US economic nationalism is based on three major assumptions
that are examined and analyzed in this Article. In each of these
assumptions, the concept of reciprocity plays a key role. The Trump
administration often argues that reciprocity in trade flows and in the
terms and conditions of trade are conditions of "fair" tradeo and that
the current lack of reciprocity in US trade relations is evidence of how
the United States is being harmed by trade. For example, President
Trump recently claimed on Twitter that "Fair trade is now to be called
Fool trade if it is not reciprocal." 1
The administration's appeal for "fair" trade is not new to US
political discourse. Since the 1980s, "[c]ongressmen, businessmen,
editorialists and the media have repeatedly emphasized fairness in
trade, 'level playing fields' and reciprocity as a pre-condition for a trade
regime to be acceptable to the United States." 12 As an economic
concept, reciprocity can be traced back centuries further to the
foundational ideas of the economists Adam Smith and David Ricardo,
further discussed below, 13 who espoused that mutual advantage-a
type of reciprocity-was inherent in trade.14 However, the Trump
administration goes beyond classic economic theory to espouse a
concept of absolute or strict reciprocity in the sense that each side in a
trade relationship must derive benefits that are either exactly the
same or that are mirror images of each other.15 The United States'
insistence on mirror-image reciprocity in trade is not only impossible
in practice but is based upon a serious misunderstanding of basic
economic concepts, as further explained below. 16
The US insistence that strict reciprocity is required in its trade
relations is one reason why the United States is not asserting this
claim in the World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement
system-the WTO does not recognize strict reciprocity as a WTO
obligation.' 7 Rather, together with the principle of National Treatment

FVN2] (archived Dec. 2, 2018) (noting that a global trade war is increasingly turning
from talk to reality).
10.
PresidentDonald J. Trump's State of the Union Address, THE WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-jtrumps-state-union-address/ [https://perma.cclPK9A-SV39] (archived Nov. 8, 2018)
[hereinafter State of the Union Address] (explaining that the new administration
expects trade to be "to be fair and to be reciprocal").
11.
Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), Twitter (June 10, 2018, 6:05 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1005979207544000512
[https://perma.cc/8F78-J89D] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
12.
See Jagdish N. Bhagwati & Douglas A. Irwin, The Return of the
Reciprocitarians-USTrade Policy Today, 10 WORLD ECON. 109, 117 (1987).
13.
See infra Part II.B.
14.
See infra Part II.B.
15.
See infra Parts III & IV.
16.
See infra Parts II.B & III.B.
17.
A more nuanced form of reciprocity, marginal or first difference reciprocity
is possible within the WTO. See infra Part IV.C.
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(NT),' 8 the WTO is built on the edifice of the Most Favored Nation
Principle (MFN), 1 9 a principle of nondiscrimination, 20 which has the
effect of multiplying trade benefits to all WTO members under a
positive-sum game theory of international trade.21 Unable to assert a

NT is a principle of nondiscrimination that prohibits GATT/WTO members
18.
from treating their own nationals better in trade than foreign nationals. General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT]. It is sometimes said that NT is a principle of internal
nondiscrimination while MFN is a principle of external nondiscrimination. Together,
NT and MFN are the twin pillars of the WTO. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 149 (3d
ed. 2017) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW].

See GATT, supra note 18, art. I(1), which provides in relevant part:
19.
"With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation . .. and with respect to the method of
levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in
connection with importation and exportation . .. any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating or destined for
any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like
product originating in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties."
The effect of this language is that a GATT/WTO member is obligated to extend
any trade benefit given to any nation, whether or not it is a GATT/WTO member, to all
other members of the WTO. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 18, at 149. The
basic concept was that universalizing trade benefits would help to increase trade not
only for individual members but for the system as a whole, a positive-sum game theory.
Although MFN was first embodied in the GATT, MFN has also been included in other
WTO agreements. See, e.g., GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services Art. II,
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the Word Trade Organization,
Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 (1994); TRIPS: Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property art. 4, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex lC, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M.
1197 (1994). Thus, MFN applies to all WTO trade in goods, services, and technology,
including intellectual property.
MFN is sometimes considered to be a principle of favoritism, but this is
20.
misleading. Rather, MFN is a principle of nondiscrimination that prevents nations
from granting special privileges in favor of a single nation or group of nations. Rather
than being a principle of favoritism, MFN is the norm in the WTO and in international
trade generally. For this reason, the United States eschews the use of MFN and prefers
instead to use the term "Normal Trade Relations." See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND

MATERIALS 138 (3d ed. 2015). At an earlier historical period, a principle of reciprocity
did exist in international law, but over time NT and MFN won the allegiance of most
nation states. See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 33-34, 39-40 (3d ed. 2017).

21.
MFN requires a WTO country to immediately and automatically extend
trade benefits given to any country to all other WTO countries. See GATT, supra note
18, art. I. The effect of MFN is to universalize trade benefits to the entire WTO
membership. A country is entitled to MFN treatment only if it is a WTO country; thus,
MFN serves the dual purpose of universalizing trade benefits and serving as an
inducement for countries to join the GATT or the WTO. Holger Hestermeyer, What is
the Most-Favoured-NationClause?, UK TRADE FORUM (Nov. 30, 2017),
https://uktradeforum.net/2017/11/30/what-is-the-most-favoured-nation-clause/
[https://perma.cc/Z4K2-K9EW] (archived Nov. 27, 2018).
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claim under the WTO, the United States has decided to act unilaterally
and outside of the WTO in imposing punitive tariffs, infuriating its
trading partners and undermining the continuing viability of the
WTO. 22

The validity of the US assumptions about reciprocity is essential
because if absolute reciprocity is required for free trade, then its
absence in US trading relationships is proof of unfairness and thus
provides the justification for the United States to impose punitive
tariffs on its trading partners to correct the unfairness. By contrast, if
absolute reciprocity is not required for fair trade, then its absence does
not provide a justification for the use of trade sanctions. From a
normative standpoint, the United States then must provide an
alternative justification or withdraw the sanctions.
Turning to the three assumptions of absolute reciprocity, the first
assumption is that international trade is a zero-sum game in which
there can be only one winner and one loser in every trade deal.2 3 This
position holds that each gain in trade by one nation must lead to a
mirror-image or reciprocal loss in trade by another nation.2 4 This
position ignores a large body of empirical and theoretical work in
international economics created in the past five decades or more that
supports the view that international trade is a positive-sum game in
which cooperative trade arrangements can increase the size of the pie
and generate increased trade volumes for the multilateral trading
system as a whole and for each nation individually. 25 Under a positivesum game, the concept of strict reciprocity does not play a role. 26
Ignoring the voluminous evidence to the contrary, 27 the Trump
administration insists that the United States has been harmed in a
zero-sum game by the trade agreements entered into under the
auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 2 8 and
its successor, the WNTO. 29

If the Trump administration ignores this existing body of theory
and empirical evidence, then on what evidence does it base its position
that ,international trade harms the United States? The current

22.
See Unilateralism,supra note 1, at 3, 24-25.
23.
See Veronique de Rugy, How Trump Misunderstands Trade, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/trump-china-tradedeficit.html [https://perma.cc/WP2S-5JF2] (archived Nov. 9, 2018) ("The first mistake
[of the Trump administration's trade policy] is the assumption that trade is a zero-sum
game, suggesting that the country selling products abroad is a winner while the one
who buys is a loser. That's simply wrong.").
24.
See infra Part II.A.
25.
See infra Part II.B for a discussion of this large body of work.
26.
See infra Part II.B.
27.
See infra Part II.B.
28.
See generally GATT, supra note 18.
29.
See generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 [hereinafter WTO].
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administration seems to rely on the next two assumptions as the
evidence of harm to the United States. The Trump administration
assumes that, in order for trade to be fair, there must be strict
reciprocity in trade volumes or a trade balance between the United
States and its trading partners.3 0 (This assumption is the second of the
three basic assumptions underlying the requirement of strict
reciprocity in trade.) Currently the United States does not enjoy
reciprocity in its trade relations with many of its trade partners but
has a trade deficit with many partners, including its closest allies, such
as Mexico ($71.1 billion), Japan ($68.8 billion), and Germany ($64.3
billion). 3 ' In the view of the administration, a trade deficit indicates an
economic loss to the nation that incurs the deficit, while a trade surplus
indicates an economic gain to the nation that enjoys the surplus. 32 In
2017, the United States had a $375 billion deficit in trade in goods with
China. 3 3 President Trump views this as evidence that the US economy
incurred a net loss of $375 billion in 2017 as a result of trade with
34
China, which enjoyed a net gain of $375 billion to its economy.
The third assumption is that the terms and conditions of trade
must be strictly reciprocal in order to be fair.3 5 Tariff rates must be
mirror images of each other; nonreciprocal tariffs indicate a loss to the
nation that has the lower tariff. 36 For example, the US tariff for
imported automobiles from China is 2.5 percent, while China has a
tariff of 25 percent for imported automobiles from the United States.37
The Trump administration claims that the difference between these
two tariff rates indicates that the United States is suffering a loss in

30. President Trump repeatedly makes these statements. In a series of tweets in
June 2018, Trump argued that billion-dollar trade surpluses enjoyed by Canada and
EU countries are evidence that they "rip us off in trade" and US farmers are faced with
such a "big and unfair price to pay." See Yan Nee Lee, Ahead of meeting with North
Korea, Trump keeps lashing out at allies Canada and Europe, CNBC (June 10, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/10/trump-fair-trade-should-be-called-fool-trade-if-itsnot-reciprocal.html [https://perma.cc/WL5W-E6PG] (archived Nov. 27, 2018).
31.
See Top TradingPartners-December2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/topl7l2yr.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HWX8-CMRF] (archived Nov. 9, 2018) (trade
deficits are in terms of goods and do not include services).
See Lee, supra note 30.
32.
See Keith Bradsher, China Cuts Car Tariffs, in a Small Offering to the U.S.
33.
on Trade, N.Y. TIMES (May 22, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/22/
business/china-cuts-auto-tariffs.html [https://perma.cc/EZ7D-XCQX] (archived Nov. 9,
2018); Trade in Goods with China 2017, U.S CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
foreign-tradefbalance/c5700.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.ce/4ZSJXTHQ] (archived Nov. 9, 2018).
See infra Part III.A.
34.
35.
See infra Part TV.
36.
See infra Part TV.
37.
See Bradsher, supra note 33.
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automobile trade with China.3 8 If the entire US tariff schedule has on
average lower tariffs than the Chinese tariff schedule, the United
States is suffering a loss in its trade with China, and the tariff rate
differential is therefore claimed by the United States to be one cause
of its massive trade deficit with China.3 9
These three assumptions, all based on a view that strict
reciprocity is a condition of fair trade, have a certain intuitive appeal
to a large segment of the US population, which helped to propel Trump
to the US presidency. The Trump administration continues to
frequently cite the lack of strict reciprocity in the media to incite the
public 40 and to justify tariffs and other extreme measures, such as
publicly berating high government officials of close US allies, such as
the European Union (EU). 41
This Article will demonstrate that the claim that strict reciprocity
is required for fair trade is fallacious by proceeding in four Parts. The
first three Parts will examine the three assumptions of US economic
nationalism in detail and analyze their validity. Using the existing
economic literature, Part II demonstrates that trade is not a zero-sum
game, as asserted by the United States, but instead is a positive-sum
game that can, under the right conditions, create mutual benefits for
numerous trading partners. Part III demonstrates that the US claim
that trade with China causes the US trade deficit and creates a direct
loss to the US economy is a fallacious argument. The causes of the US
trade deficit are tied to macroeconomic policies, such as saving and
consumption, not trading with a specific nation. Part IV demonstrates
that requiring identical tariff rates and conditions of trade between the
United States and China is based on a misunderstanding of how tariff
schedules are negotiated under the WTO; it is myopic and misleading
to point to isolated tariff rates for one or more particular goods as an
example of unfairness instead of examining the overall balance of

38.
See id. (discussing how the Trump administration's complaints about the
auto industry).
39.
See infra Part IV.
40.
President Trump reiterated this point in a Tweet on April 9, 2018 noting
that US and Chinese tariffs on automobiles are not reciprocal. Donald Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 9, 2018), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/
status/983284198046826496[https://perma.cc/YFV5-ZDHT] (archived Nov. 27, 2018)
("When a car is sent to the United States from China, there is a Tariff to be paid of 2
1/2%. When a car is sent to China from the United States, there is a Tariff to be paid of
25%. Does that sound like free or fair trade. No, it sounds like STUPID TRADE - going
on for years!").
41.
See Michael Birnbaum & Seung Min Kim, Trump berates NATO Allies and
then asks them to double their defense spending goals, WASH. POST (July 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/worldleurope/trump-says-germanyis-captive-torussia-in-fiery-opening-salvo-against-nato2018/07/11/56aa7174-7f0a- 1 1e8-a63f7b5d2aba7ac5_story.html?utm-term=.885270al38d7 [https://perma.cc/6Y2N-M9HK]
(archived Nov. 27, 2018).
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concessions in the tariff schedules as a whole. Part V then discusses
the consequences of this analysis for US economic sanctions.

II.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AS A ZERO-SUM GAME

A. The Trump Administration's View of InternationalTrade
In the 2018 State of the Union Address, President Trump stated:
America has also finally turned the page on decades of unfair trade deals that
sacrificed our prosperity and shipped away our companies, our jobs, and our
Nation's wealth. The era of economic surrender is over. From now on, we expect
42
trading relationships to be fair and to be reciprocal.

The Trump administration's trade policy is formally set forth and
43
elaborated in the President's National Trade Policy Agenda, which is
submitted by the United States Trade Representative (USTR), the
chief US official responsible for international trade.44 The USTR is also
charged by US law to "act as the principal spokesman of the President
on International Trade." 4 5 In the 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, the USTR,
Robert Lighthizer, stated:
The overarching purpose of our trade policy-the guiding principle behind all of
our actions in this key area-will be to expand trade in a way that is freer and
fairer for all Americans. Every action we take with respect to trade will be
designed to increase our economic growth, promote job creation in the United
States, promote reciprocity with our trading partners, strengthen our
manufacturing base and our ability to defend ourselves, and expand our
agricultural and services industry exports. As a general matter, we believe that
these goals can be best accomplished by focusing on bilateral negotiations rather
than multilateral negotiations-and by renegotiating and revising trade
agreements when our goals are not being met. Finally, we reject the notion that
the United States should, for putative geopolitical advantage, turn a blind eye to
unfair trade practices that disadvantage American workers, farmers, ranchers,
46
and businesses in global markets.

President Trump's statement, reiterated by the USTR, is a prime
illustration of the Trump administration's main claims that trade has

See State of the Union Address, supra note 10.
42.
43.
See generally U.S. TRADE REP., THE PRESIDENT'S 2017 TRADE POLICY
AGENDA (2017), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/reports/2017/AnnualReport/
Chapter%20I%20-%20The%2OPresident%27s%2OTrade%2OPolicy%2OAgenda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2F9G-RFZQ] (archived Nov. 27, 2018) [hereinafter 2017 TRADE
POLICY].
See About Us, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., https://ustr.gov/about-us
44.
(last visited Dec. 2, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7B45-Q24P] (archived Nov. 27, 2018).
19 U.S.C. § 2171(c)(1)(E) (2012).
45.
See 2017 TRADE POLICY, supra note 43, at 1.
46.
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benefited US trading partners but has caused serious economic losses
to the United States. The statement is also an example of the Trump
administration's reliance on the key concept of reciprocity: trade must
be reciprocal in order to be fair. The concept of reciprocity is also
emphasized by the USTR who, in addition, reinforces the importance
of that concept by viewing it primarily in bilateral, not multilateral,
terms.
The concept of reciprocity, as further explained below, means
strict equivalence in trade flows and also in the terms and conditions
of trade in a bilateral trading relationship. If there is nonreciprocity in
a bilateral trade relationship, then the nation suffering the shortage in
the trade flows or terms and conditions is being treated unfairly and is
the loser in the trade relationship. This view suggests that trade is a
simple zero-sum game between two nations locked in a bilateral
struggle to determine who will be the winner and the loser in a trade
agreement. For the Trump administration, the United States has too
often been the loser under the poor guidance of prior administrations.
In other words, the United States will henceforth win in its trade
relationship with its trading partners. To achieve this goal, the USTR
has identified four priorities:
(1) defend U.S. national sovereignty over trade policy; (2) strictly enforce U.S.
trade laws; (3) use all possible sources of leverage to encourage other countries
to open their markets to U.S. exports of goods and services, and provide adequate
and effective protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property rights; and
(4) negotiate new and better trade deals with countries in key markets around
47
the world.

The first of these priorities-the elevation of US sovereignty over
trade policy-is vital to understanding US economic nationalism. By
"trade policy," the USTR means the WTO and its rules and decisions. 48
By this priority, the USTR implies that the United States will
disregard the rules and decisions of the WTO when they conflict with
US sovereign interests. 49 Under the second and third priorities, the
United States will use trade sanctions or the threat of sanctions to
enforce its laws and protect its rights and interests;5 0 under the fourth
priority, the United States indicates that it will adopt a negotiation
strategy that uses the threat of trade sanctions to induce US trading
partners to renegotiate unfavorable trade agreements entered into by
prior US administrations. 5 1 The Trump administration has boasted

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 2.
Unilateralism,supra note 1, at Part H.
id.
id. at Part III.
id. at Part III.F.
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that this strategy was successful in the case of South Korea. 52 On
March 27, 2018, to avoid newly announced tariffs on steel and
aluminum, South Korea agreed to a number of new trade concessions,
including a limit of 2.68 tons of steel exports to the United States per
year, or roughly 70 percent of the volume of steel exports from Korea
to the United States, for the years 2015-17.53
B. InternationalTrade as a Positive-Sum Game
The notion that trade is a positive-sum game is a core idea in
international economics, with a long pedigree dating back to Adam
Smith's Wealth of Nations. 54 Smith essentially debunked
mercantilism, the dominant political economic philosophy of the time,
which claimed that for a trading country, exports are good and imports
bad.55 Smith's key contribution was to argue that if a country is more
productive at producing, say, cloth compared to another country, while
the other country is more productive at producing, say, wine, then each
country should reallocate its resources to producing and trading that
good in which it has an absolute advantage. 56
Although important in the unilateral push in nineteenth century
Britain toward free trade starting with its repeal of the corn laws, it
was David Ricardo writing in the early nineteenth century who
developed the principle of comparative advantage-one that all
students of economics are exposed to, and an idea that Paul
Samuelson, the Nobel Prize-winning economist, once described as a
"non-trivial" theorem. 57 The gap in Smith's argument was that it
ignored the possibility that one country has an absolute advantage in
producing both cloth and wine, the logical conclusion of which is that
there would be no trade.5 8
Ricardo's contribution was to recognize that it was relative
productivity that mattered-what is the opportunity cost in each
country of shifting resources (labor) from producing cloth to producing

52.
See Alan Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Trump Gets First Major Trade Deal
as South Korea Looks to Avoid Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/26/business/south-korea-us-tariffs.html
[https://perma.cc/PH3U-N7US] (archived Nov. 27, 2018).
53.
See id.
54.

See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE

WEALTH OF NATIONS 505-06 (1976).
55.

See Laura Lahaye, Mercantilism, THE LIBRARY OF EcON. & LIBERTY,

https://www.econlib.org/library/EnclMercantilism.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/SBK8-E7W3] (archived Nov. 26, 2018).
See THOMAS A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 32-34 (2007).
56.
See PAUL A. SAMUELSON, The Way of An Economist, in INTERNATIONAL
57.
EcoNOMIc RELATIONS 1-11 (1969).

58.

See PUGEL, supra note 56, at 34-35.
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wine, where opportunity cost is defined as the units of cloth given up
to produce an extra unit of wine.5 9 In his famous example of trade
between Britain and Portugal, Ricardo observed that Portugal was
absolutely more productive at producing both cloth and wine, yet
Britain exported cloth to Portugal in exchange for imports of wine. 60
As described in every undergraduate textbook in international
economics, the opportunity cost of Britain reallocating labor to
producing cloth was lower than for Portugal, and vice-versa for wine. 61
Therefore, if Britain and Portugal specialized in producing the goods
in which they had a comparative advantage, the volume of cloth and
wine produced globally would be greater as a result of efficient resource
allocation. 62 Of course this result gets at the idea of specialization, but
in order to understand why trade is not a zero-sum game, the idea that
there are gains from international exchange has to be introduced along
with sources of those gains from trade. 63
An important corollary to Ricardo's result is that prior to trade, a
country's relative prices-here the price of cloth relative to the price of
wine-will depend on the opportunity cost of producing cloth. 64 So in
the simple example, with no trade, Britain's relative price of cloth will
be lower than that for Portugal, and the reverse is true for wine. This
difference in relative prices is enough to generate trade between the
two countries once they move away from autarky (no trade); in other
words, agents who trade cloth and wine will reduce the difference in
relative prices through the process of "arbitrage," at least up to the
65
point where they can just cover transport costs.
Arbitrage means that Portugal will seek to import cloth from
Britain, which necessarily bids up the relative price of cloth in Britain,
while lowering the relative price of cloth in Portugal. At the same time,
Britain will seek to import wine from Portugal, which increases the
relative price of wine in Portugal, and lowers the relative price of wine
in Britain. This process continues until there are no longer any reasons
to trade, or both Britain and Portugal face the same set of (world)
relative prices for cloth and wine, with Britain specializing in
producing cloth and Portugal specializing in producing wine.
The idea that relative prices have to differ between countries for
trade to occur is really quite fundamental to international economic
theory. In the Ricardian world, and its modern versions, it is

59.
See Robert W. Dimand, Ricardo and InternationalTrade Theory, 8 HIST.
ECON. IDEAS 7, 7-24 (2000).
60.
See id. at 8-9.
61.
See PUGEL, supra note 56, at 35-38.
62.
See id. at 35-38.
63.

See JAMES R. MARKUSEN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE; THEORY AND

EVIDENCE 61-68 (1995).
64.
See id. at 87-89.
65.
See PUGEL, supra note 56, at 36-37.
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differences in labor productivity across countries that matter. 66 By
contrast, in the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) 67 world, it is
relative endowments of inputs such as labor and capital that matter;
Britain has a lower relative price of cloth compared to Portugal because
it is relatively well endowed in capital compared to labor, with
production of cloth being capital intensive. 68 In contrast, Portugal has
a lower relative price of wine compared to Britain because it is
relatively well endowed in labor, with production of wine being labor
intensive. Relative specialization occurs where Britain and Portugal
export the good that intensively uses the input in which they are
relatively well endowed.
Whether trade results from differences in productivity or relative
factor endowments, the economic benefits from specialization along
with the benefits from exchange are fundamental to the so-called gains
from trade theorem, which underlies the argument that trade is a
positive-sum game.6 9 The intuition for this theorem is as follows: under
autarky, relative prices in an economy ensure that the supply of goods
equals demand, such that inputs such as labor and capital are fully
employed, and the value of a country's national income (GDP) is
maximized. 70 With trade, relative prices adjust to reflect a country's
comparative advantage, and even if its pattern of production does not
change immediately, a country benefits from being able to exchange
goods at world relative prices. 71 Specifically, based on their
preferences, consumers are able to substitute toward importing the
good whose relative price has fallen with trade, thereby increasing
their utility-the gains from exchange. 72 Once production adjusts to
world relative prices, there is an additional gain in utility to
consumers-the gains from specialization.7 3 A way to think of this is
that by continuing to produce at the autarky position at world relative
prices, a country is not maximizing its national income, even though
consumers are able to benefit from the lower-priced import(s) (a
substitution effect), but once production does adjust, national income
increases and consumers are even better off as their purchasing power
74
has risen (an income effect).

See Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum, Putting Ricardo to Work, 26 J. ECON.
66.
PERSP. 65, 65-79 (2012).
See Ronald W. Jones & J. Peter Neary, Positive Theory of International
67.
Trade, in 1 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 14 (Ronald W. Jones & Peter B.

Kenen eds., 1984).
See MARKUSEN ET AL., supra note 63, at 104-08.
68.
See id. at 63-66.
69.
See id. at 64.
70.
See id. at 70.
71.
See id.
72.
See id. at 68-70.
73.
See id.
74.
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By the preceding logic, trade must be a positive-sum game. For
example, lowering tariffs will increase the global volume of trade,
raising trading countries' GDPs and thereby consumer purchasing
power. Of course, the gains from trade may not be evenly distributed
between countries, and in the limit it is possible that relative prices
only move in favor of one country, the other facing no change in relative
prices. Necessarily though, countries will trade as long as they either
benefit or they are at least no worse off than under autarky.
There is an important caveat to the previous result: within a
country there can be both winners and losers from trade. "The corollary
of the HOS model is that resources used intensively in exportcompeting sectors benefit from trade," 7 while resources used
intensively in import-competing sectors are made worse off.76 In the
United States, it might be expected that trade will benefit a skilled
worker such as a researcher at a pharmaceutical firm, while unskilled
US manufacturing workers would be worse off.77 This result, originally
proposed by Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson, 78 implies that
international trade can have a significant impact on the distribution of
income. However, the orthodox view as outlined "is that benefits to
winners (skilled workers and consumers) will outweigh costs to losers
(unskilled workers)."7 9 Openness to trade therefore passes the benefitcost test: the winners can in principle compensate the losers and still
be better off.
Until the 1980s, the workhorse of international economic analysis
was the HOS model.8 0 However, it did not do a particularly good job of
explaining observed trade patterns in the post-war period.8 1 Prior to
the 1990s, the flow of trade in goods was mostly between developed
countries. 82 For example, high-income countries accounted for 80
percent of world trade in 1985.83 Specifically, countries with similar
GDP per capita produced goods "such as automobiles, constrained by
economies of scale and the size of their own market, and then traded

75.
Ian M. Sheldon, The Economic Impact of Tariffs on Chinese Imports: A
Potentially Costly Mistake?, ANDERSONS
POLICY
BULLETIN
(Dec.
2016),
https://aede.osu.edulsites/aede/files/publication-files/Andersons%2Policy%20Bulletin
%2012%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G8N-RRBK] (archived Nov. 26, 2018).
76.
See An inconvenient iota of truth, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 6, 2016),
http://www.economist.com/news/economics-briefl21703350-third-our-series-looksstolper-samuelson-theorem-inconvenient-iota [https://perma.cc/74RV-QVSU] (archived
Nov. 26, 2018).
77.
See Jonathan Haskel et al., Globalizationand US Wages: Modifying Classic
Theory to Explain Recent Facts, 26 J. EcON. PERSP. 127, 119-40 (2012).
78.
See id.
79.
Sheldon, supra note 75, at 1; see Haskel, supra note 77, at 128-31.
80.
See Gordon H. Hanson, The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies
in Global Trade, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 41, 42-48 (2012).
81.
See id.
82.
See id.
83.
See id. at 42; see also Sheldon, supra note 75, at 1.
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those goods with other high-income countries in a larger integrated
market for similar but differentiated goods" (i.e., intra-industry
trade). 84 This contrasted with the key prediction of the HOS model that
countries would trade different products (i.e., inter-industry trade).8 5
Paul Krugman and others introduced a number of innovations in
trade theory that helped explain the empirical observation that intraand inter-industry trade could exist simultaneously. 86 Compared to
the HOS model, Krugman allowed for the possibility that in industries
such as automobiles, goods are differentiated as well as being produced
by a few firms constrained by economies of scale-a market structure
termed monopolistic competition.8 7 Each firm in the industry produces
a good that is different from the competition (brand monopoly), but
given a distribution of consumer preferences, firms will enter the
industry with new brands (competition) until it is no longer profitable
to do so. In equilibrium, the number of entrants into an industry is
determined by the extent of economies of scale and the size of the
market.8 8
This type of structure was then married to the HOS model,
whereby a differentiated goods industry was assumed to be capital
intensive, while a second industry was assumed to be labor intensive
producing a homogeneous good under constant returns to scale. 8 9
Assuming a country is relatively well endowed in capital allows for
both inter- and intra-industry trade.9 0 Specifically, under reasonable
assumptions, the country that is relatively well endowed in capital
(labor) will be a net exporter (importer) of differentiated goods and an
importer (exporter) of the homogenous good. 91 Consequently, in
moving from autarky to trade, there are now additional gains to trade,
beyond what the HOS model predicts: specifically, in the integrated
world market, consumers benefit from a greater variety of goods sold
at lower prices, and there may also be additional realization of scale
economies. 92
While highly influential, Krugman's model assumed that firms
were homogenous in the sense that they were all equally productive;
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there was nothing in his model that would predict which firms would
produce which goods in which country in the trading equilibrium.93
Krugman's model could not explain some important stylized facts that
were discovered when firm-level trade data became more accessible:
specifically, only a relatively small number of firms actually export,
and those that do export tend to be larger, more skilled, and capital
intensive, and also exhibit higher levels of labor productivity. 94
Essentially, a systematic relationship appears to exist between the
characteristics of firms and their participation in export markets.95
Seminal research by Marc Melitz and others has focused on the
idea that firms will incur additional fixed costs when entering export
markets, and that only the most productive firms will be able to bear
such costs while remaining profitable. 96 Melitz showed that in the
context of barriers to trade, there would be two key productivity cutoff
points in the domestic market. 9 7 Below a lower productivity level,
domestic firms would be unable to bear the fixed costs of supplying
even the domestic market.9 8 Above that lower productivity level and
up to a higher productivity level, domestic firms would be able to bear
the fixed costs of supplying the domestic market alone.9 9 Above the
higher productivity level, domestic firms would be able to bear the fixed
costs of supplying both the domestic and export markets. 100 With
increased market access due to bilateral trade liberalization, the
productivity level necessary to survive in the domestic market would
increase, while the productivity level necessary to enter the export
market would decrease. 0 1 As a consequence, some low-productivity
domestic firms will exit the domestic market and be replaced by new
foreign exporting firms, some domestic firms that are already
productive enough to export will export more, and new domestic firms
will also enter the export market.10 2 In other words, with reduction in
barriers to trade, there will be resource allocation within industries. 0 3
This means that consumers will not only benefit from lower prices of
imports at the so-called intensive margin due to higher average firm
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productivity, but also at the so-called extensive margin because of
entry of new, more productive firms in the domestic market. 104
In the post-war period, global trade has grown: the value of world
merchandise trade as a share of world GDP has increased from 17.5
percent in 1960 to 42.3 percent by 2016.105 Also over this period there
have been multiple rounds of tariff cutting under the auspices of the
GATT, 106 So it might be expected that growth in the volume of trade
would be correlated with multilateral trade liberalization. 107 Not
surprisingly, there have been several empirical studies that have
explored the relationship between membership of the GATT/WTO and
countries' trade flows. 108 A widely accepted study by Arvind
Subramanian and Shang-Jin Wei argues that the impact of a country's
membership of GATT/WTO will depend on three dimensions: first,
what a country does with its membership; second, with which other
countries a country negotiates; and, third, which products are covered
in trade negotiations.1 09 The study's econometric results are consistent
with these predictions: industrial countries that have participated in
multilateral trade negotiations have enjoyed a significant increase in
trade, bilateral trade is greater when many countries engage in tariff
reduction as compared to when only a subset of countries do, and
sectors such as agriculture that were not covered by trade negotiations
exhibit little or no increases in trade. 110 However, subsequent
empirical work has established that countries' agricultural trade has

104. See Arnaud Costinot & Andr6s Rodriguez-Clare, Trade Theory with
Numbers: Quantifying the Consequences of Globalization, in 4 HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, supra note 100, at 208-10.
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110. See id. at 152.
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also been significantly increased by their memberships in
GATT/WTO."u
In terms of the gains from trade, over the past twenty years,
considerable advances have been made evaluating trade theory,
especially through application of the so-called gravity model.11 2 As a
consequence, best practice in the applied international economics
literature has evolved to the point where it is possible to measure the
benefits of trade predicted by both the traditional models as well as
those of a more recent vintage. 113 This methodology has been
extensively reviewed by leading trade economists Arnaud Costinot and
Andr6s Rodriguez-Clare in the latest volume of The Handbook of
InternationalEconomics,114 and while the details are highly technical,
their bottom line is very revealing and clearly undermines the notion
that trade is a zero-sum game. In their main empirical exercise,
Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare use 2008 World Bank data for a sample
of forty major countries to simulate what would happen to each
country's real income if they returned to autarky." 5 On average across
the sample, the empirical results predict that, without including
intermediate goods, the real income gains from trade range from 14
percent to 15 percent depending on whether markets are competitive
or monopolistically competitive, and if intermediate goods are factored
in, the real income gains from trade range from 27 percent to 40
percent.1 16 Including trade in intermediate goods captures another
channel for gains from trade: domestically produced goods' prices fall,
and if those goods are also inputs into producing final goods, there are
additional productivity gains leading to larger real income gains (i.e.,
there is an input-output loop)."

7

While great progress has been made in international economics in
measuring the gains from trade, the results outlined are essentially
static (i.e., there is a shock to trade and the gains (losses) are oneoff). 1 8 As described above, it is well understood that trade has a procompetitive effect, with import competition driving down firms' profit
margins, followed by a selection effect where less-profitable/lessproductive firms exit markets." 9 What is not captured though is the
impact that these effects have on investment in innovation as firms try

111. See also Jason H. Grant & Kathryn A. Boys, Agricultural Trade and the
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to raise their productivity and seek advantage over foreign
competitors.1 20 In other words, there may be a sequence of gains in
productivity and associated price reductions over time that benefit
both current and future consumers. A recent body of literature has
begun to address this with interesting results. For example,
Giammario Impullitti and Omar Licandro conduct an experiment
where they push the US economy to shutting down trade, their results
indicating that the gains from trade are 50 percent higher than under
autarky, half of this gain coming from the effect that trade has on firms'
incentives to innovate.1 21 In other words, even best-practice applied
methodology is likely underestimating the gains from trade. This
possibility was confirmed in recent research by Swati Dhingra and
others. 122 The research evaluated the potential economic impact on the
UK of its decision to exit the EU, known as "Brexit."1 23 Their static
results suggest that on average, households in the UK will suffer
income losses ranging from 1.34 percent to 2.66 percent depending on
whether the UK chooses to remain relatively close to the EU by
becoming a member of the European Economic Association (EEA), or
whether it chooses to leave the EU altogether and trade under WTO
rules. 124 By contrast, their dynamic results indicate that per capita
5
income losses could range from 6.3 percent to 9.4 percent.' 2 Even
though the "hardest" Brexit is not a move to autarky, the income losses
are expected to be significant. In other words, for the UK, being part of
the EU with its highly integrated "internal" market has been a
positive-sum game.

III. TRADE DEFICITS ARE CAUSED BY TRADE AND ARE A DIRECT Loss TO
THE

US

ECONOMY

The previous Part shows that over the decades since the
establishment of the GATT/WTO, trade volumes and real GDP have
grown for the world and for nations, including the United States.
Without explanation, the Trump administration seems to just flatly
ignore the large body of theoretical and empirical work that supports
the view of trade as a positive-sum game. If so, then on what evidence
is the current administration basing its argument that trade has

120. See id.
121. See id.
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harmed the United States? To understand its position, we now turn to
two other economic assumptions that the United States uses to support
its case that it is being harmed by trade: trade deficits and
nonreciprocal tariffs.
A. BilateralTrade Deficits as a Direct Loss to US GDP
A basic assumption of the Trump administration is that trade
flows between trading partners must be reciprocal to be fair. 2 6 In this
view, a trade deficit occurs when there is nonreciprocity in the trade
flows between two nations.' 2 7
Although a trade deficit can apply to other categories such as
services and technology, most of the time that the US media or experts
discuss trade deficits, they are referring to trade in goods.1 2 8 A trade
deficit in goods exists when a nation, such as the United States,
purchases more goods from its trading partner than it sells to the same
partner.1 29 In the example of China, the United States had a trade
deficit in 2017 of $375 billion, indicating that the United States
purchased $375 billion more in goods from China than China
purchased from the United States. 3 0 Specifically, in 2017, the United
States imported $130 billion worth of goods from China while exporting
$505 billion worth of goods to China.' 3 ' When the United States sells
goods to China, it is earning revenue;1 32 when the United States buys
goods from China, the United States is spending its funds and China
earns revenue. 3 3 In its trade with China, the United States spends
more than it earns, while China earns more than it spends.1 34 The
Trump administration sees the gap between what the United States
earns in its trade in goods with China and what it spends as a direct
loss to the US economy.' 3 5 Although the Trump administration often
focuses on China for unfair trade practices and the trade deficit with
China is by far the largest, the United States also has large trade
deficits with numerous other trade partners, including Mexico,
Canada, Japan, and Germany.1 36 The Trump administration also sees
these deficits as evidence that the United States is suffering many
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losses from trade. As US trade in goods with all of these nations is
governed by the GATT/WTO, the president therefore views the
GATT/WTO as unfair to the United States.1 3 7
In addition, the administration believes that the trade deficit with
China is exacerbated by various illegal and unfair practices, including
the use of government subsidies and the theft of intellectual
property.13 8 Moreover, in the administration's view, the trade deficit in
goods also has many harmful indirect impacts, such as causing the
relocation of companies to China and other foreign locations and the
1 39
loss of jobs in the United States that have been moved abroad.
Although China is often the target of the Trump administration's ire
and criticism, similar issues arise in connection with trade with many
other nations.
B. A Closer Look at Trade Deficits
As just noted, a key characteristic of the Trump administration's
approach to "fair" trade is its focus on the US trade deficit, and in
particular, the significant bilateral trade deficits it has with countries
such as China and Germany. This focus is driven by the notion that
reciprocity requires bilateral trade to be balanced, and if a trading
partner does run a trade surplus with the United States, it must be
because it is not granting equal reciprocal access. This is another
dimension of seeing trade as a zero-sum game; countries running a
trade surplus with the United States must be "winners" while the
United States must be a "loser." President Trump has frequently
expressed this view, tweeting on April 4, 2018:
We are not in trade war with China, that war was lost many years ago by the
foolish, or incompetent people who represented the U.S. Now we have a Trade
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Partnershipto Contain China in InternationalTrade, 17 CHI. J. INT'L L. 370, 395-99
(2017) (discussing government subsidies paid to state owned-enterprises);
Unilateralism,supra note 1, at Part IH.A (discussing China's alleged thefts of US
intellectual property).
139. See Full transcript:Donald Trump's jobs plan speech, POLITICO (June 6,
2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/full-transcript-trump-job-plan-speech224891 [https://perma.cc/5TER-D3PGI (archived Nov. 8, 2018) ("Our politicians have
aggressively pursued a policy of globalization - moving our jobs, our wealth and our
factories to Mexico and overseas."); Swanson, supra note 130 (discussing the Trump
administration's citation of the trade gap as a reason for manufacturing decline).
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Deficit of $500 Billion a year, with Intellectual Property Theft of another $300
140
Billion. We cannot let this continue!

If this were simply the argument of an ill-informed politician, that
would be one thing, but the president is receiving advice on how to deal
with the US trade deficit from both economist Peter Navarro, head of
the White House National Trade Council, and Wilbur Ross, the
Commerce Secretary, that is fundamentally flawed. 141 During the
presidential election, Navarro and Ross wrote a position paper on
trade 142 that, to quote one observer, "shows a mind-boggling
misunderstanding of the effect of trade on GDP." 14 3 In addition, once
in office, the president signed an executive order directing the
Commerce Department and the USTR to assess what is driving the US
trade deficit, with a focus on the extent to which countries with a
bilateral surplus with the United States are acting unfairly. 144 The
corollary of this is that a US trade policy pushing trade partners, in
bilateral negotiations, to reduce their trade surpluses with the United
States will reduce the US trade deficit, and, at the same time, increase
its GDP growth rate.1 4 5
In order to illustrate why this policy conclusion is a fallacy, and
why virtually all economists would disagree with it, 146 it is necessary
to outline some basic national income accounting relationships that
can be used to show that the US trade deficit is a structural
macroeconomic problem that will not be resolved through bilateral
trade negotiations. Starting with the national income accounting
identity for an open economy, this can be stated as Y=C+I+G+(X-1)
where Y is a country's GDP (aggregate supply of goods and services);
C+I+G (aggregate demand for goods and services) is made up of total

140. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 4, 2018 2:22 PM),
https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/981492087328792577?lang-en
[https://perma.cclZ8T6-F4X9] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
141. See David R. Henderson, Trump's trade trifecta will likely target China,
Canada and beyond, FRASER INST. (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/blogs/
trump-s-trade-trifecta-will-likely-target-china-canada-and-beyond [https://perma.cc/
L42R-KD66] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
142. See NAVARRO & Ross, supra note 4.
143. See Henderson, supra note 141.
144. See Caroline Freund, Public Comment on Trump AdministrationReport on
Significant Trade Deficits, PETERSON INST. INT'L ECON. (May 8, 2017), https://piie.com/
blogs/trade-investment-policy-watchlpublic-comment-trump-administration-reportsignificant-trade [https://perma.cc/KZH9-LSLC] (archived Nov. 8. 2018).
145. See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE, PETERSON INST. INT'L EcoN., POLICY BRIEF 18-6:
FIVE REASONS WHY THE Focus ON TRADE DEFICITS IS MISLEADING 5 (Mar. 2018),
https://piie.com/system/files/documents/pbl8-6.pdf [https://perma.ccl6K55-BLHG]
(archived. Nov. 6, 2018).
146. See C. FRED BERGSTEN, PETERSON INST. INT'L ECON., POLCY BRIEF 17-23:
TRADE BALANCES AND THE NAFTA RENEGOTIATION 2 (June 2017), https://piie.com/
system/files/documents/pbl7-23.pdf [https://perma.cclYJ57-P2XL] (archived Dec. 2,
2018).
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household consumption of goods and services (C), investment
purchases by firms of goods and services (I), and government purchases
of goods (G); and X and M are the total exports and imports of goods
and services, (X-M) being a country's current account (CA). 147
The national income accounting identity is an equality, that is, it
is true regardless of the value of its variables. Therefore, it is very
straightforward to dismiss the argument that reducing imports will
increase a country's GDP. More importantly though, this identity can
be rearranged to show that the current account (X-M) is in surplus or
deficit depending on the difference between the aggregate supply (Y)
and demand (C+I+G) of goods and services (i.e., CA=Y-(C+I+G)).
Essentially, if aggregate supply (demand) exceeds aggregate demand
(supply), a country will run a trade surplus (deficit). Therefore, in the
case of the United States which runs a current account deficit, imports
of goods and services make up the difference between what US
residents supply and demand. 148
This leads to a key question: what is the root cause of the US trade
deficit? To answer this requires rewriting the national income
accounting identity to highlight the connection between the flow of
goods and services (C, I, G, X, and M) and financial flows. Specifically,
a country's national savings (S) are made up of private and public
savings. Private savings are defined as GDP net of taxes minus
consumption (Y-T-C), while public savings are defined as the
difference between government revenue generated through taxation
and government spending (T-G) (i.e., national savings can be denoted
as S=(Y-T)-C+(T-G)). 149 Assuming that the taxes deducted from
income are the same as the taxes levied by the government, then
national savings can be defined as S=Y-C-G. The expression for
national savings can then be used to rewrite the national income
accounting identity as CA=S-I (i.e., the current account is the
difference between a country's savings and investment). Therefore, the
underlying macroeconomic reason for the US trade deficit is due to the
fact that the US supply of savings (S) is less than its demand for
investment (I).15o In other words, as a nation, the United States does
not save enough, a conclusion with which virtually all economists
agree. 151 Figure 1 clearly illustrates that since the 1980s, as a
percentage of GDP, US investment has exceeded national savings, and
at the same time the United States has consistently run a trade deficit.

147. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND
POLICY 300 (2012) [hereinafter KRUGMAN THEORY].
148. See id. at 300-01.
149. See id. at 303-04
150. See id. at 302-04.

151.

See Freund, supra note 144.
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and budget legislation passed in Congress in 2017158 and trade policy
supported by the Trump administration will increase the US fiscal
deficit, which will feed into an increase in the current account
deficit.1 59 This outcome will be exacerbated by the fact that the US
economy is currently running at full employment, output being
constrained by capacity. 16 0 Therefore, increased spending due to tax
cuts will almost entirely go into imported goods and services thereby
increasing the trade deficit. 16 1
In thinking about the second question, while the administration
focuses its concern on the fact that the United States currently runs
bilateral trade deficits with countries such as China and Germany,
economists argue that these are of little or no concern.1 6 2 What matters
is that in order to facilitate its aggregate trade deficit, the United.
States continues to run a negative and growing net international
investment position (NIIP), as shown in Figure 3.163

158. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).
159. See Jeffrey Frankel, Donald Trump is making America's deficits great again,
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2018/jan/15/
donald-trump-is-making-americas-deficits-great-again [https://perma.cc/86SD-N6PE]
(archived Nov. 8, 2018).
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See Freund, supra note 144.
163. See Joseph E. Gagnon, The Unsustainable Trajectory of US International
Debt, PETERSON INST. INT'L EcoN. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://piie.com/blogs/realtimeeconomic-issues-watch/unsustainable-trajectory-us-international-debt
[https://perma.cc/S54H-QUY2]
(archived Nov.
8, 2018)
[hereinafter Gagnon
Unsustainable].
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Figure 3: US Current Account and Net International Investment
Position, 1976-2015164
At of the end of 2016, foreign financial claims on the United States
exceeded US financial claims on other countries by $8.4 trillion, NNIP
being -45 percent of GDP, and forecast to increase to -53 percent of
GDP by 2021.165 Economists such as Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth
Rogoff, current and former chief economists at the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), have argued that this is not sustainable and
would require a significant real depreciation of the US dollar with
associated adjustment costs, and the longer the trade deficit continues,
66
the more extreme relative price adjustments will have to be.1
Economists, with almost no exceptions, are in agreement that
trade policy will not solve the US trade deficit/international debt
problem.167 The empirical evidence suggests that trade policy has little
effect on a country's trade balance-average tariffs are negatively
correlated with trade balances, and liberalizing trade has little impact
on those balances.1 68 More restrictive trade policy, such as higher
tariffs, will therefore have only a marginal effect, if any, on the US

164.
165.
166.

See BEA's Support of Open Data, supra note 152.
See Gagnon Unsustainable,supra note 163.
Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, Global CurrentAccount Imbalances

and Exchange Rate Adjustments, 1 BROOKINGS: PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY No. 67, at

74 (2005).
167. See Freund, supranote 144.
168. See id.
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trade deficit. 169 While tariffs do reduce imports, they will also reduce
exports, which follows from the fact that import tariffs reduce the
demand for foreign currency, thereby strengthening the US dollar,
which then feeds into lower exports. 170
Many economists believe two interdependent policy choices need
to be made in order to target the underlying macroeconomic cause of
the US trade deficit: a managed real depreciation of the US dollar in
combination with policies designed to increase national savings."1
Joseph Gagnon and Fred Bergsten of the Peterson Institute for
International Economics have argued that the United States should
announce a policy of "countervailing currency intervention" to offset
any currency intervention by G20 countries that are running trade
surpluses. 172 At the same time, the gap between US savings and
investment should be reduced by cutting the fiscal deficit.1 73 Without
the latter, there is a potential for overheating in the US economy as
inflation increases with dollar depreciation, resulting in the Federal
Reserve raising interest rates.' 7 4 The latter would encourage more
savings and less investment but, at the same time, put upward
pressure on the dollar as US financial assets become more attractive
to overseas lenders. 7 5 Therefore, reducing the fiscal deficit will result
in lower interest rates, which will in turn help with currency
depreciation.
As outlined here, these policy choices are matters of
macroeconomic policy, and not trade policy, such as higher tariffs.
Indeed, there is little debate among economists on this point. 176 The
hurdle to implementing such changes has been a political one because
a number of these specific policy choices, such as taxing consumption
and increasing public saving through higher taxes and/or lower
government spending, are highly unpopular with the American
electorate.' 7 7 Thus, a significant practical issue has been the lack of

169.

See id.

170. See id.
171. See Joseph E. Gagnon, Curbing the Growth of US InternationalDebt,
PETERSON INST. INT'L EcoN. (Mar. 29, 2017), https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economicissues-watch/curbing-growth-us-international-debt [https://perma.cc/95QF-YUEV]
(archived Nov. 5, 2018).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See Freund, supra note 144.
177. See Fewer Want Spending to Grow, But Most Cuts Remain Unpopular, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www.people-press.org/2011/02/10/fewer-wantspending-to-grow-but-most-cuts-remain-unpopular [https://perma.cc/9QDE-P38C]
(archived Nov. 5, 2018) (data showing the difficulty of raising taxes or decreasing
spending); John Gramlich, Few Americans Support Cuts to Most Government
Programs,Including Medicaid, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (May 26, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/05/26/few-americans-support-cuts-to-most-

2019]

STRICT RECIPROCITY

29

political will on the part of elected US government officials who are
reluctant to propose and implement unpopular policy changes for fear
of stoking the ire of their constituencies.17 8

IV. NONRECIPROCAL TARIFFS AS CAUSING A LOSS TO THE US ECONOMY
An additional argument made by the Trump administration to
support its view that trade harms the United States is based on the
unfairness of nonreciprocal tariffs. 179 The concept of reciprocity
requires that the terms and conditions of trade between nations must
be strictly reciprocal, or equivalent. At the level of tariffs, the tariff rate
between two trading partners must be reciprocal, or the same, for any
particular imported good. According to President Trump, nonreciprocal
tariffs are evidence of unfairness to the nation with lower tariffs:
When a car is sent to the United States from China, there is a Tariff to be paid
of 2 1/2%. When a car is sent to China from the United States, there is a Tariff
to be paid of 25%. Does that sound like free or fair trade? No, it sounds like
80
STUPID TRADE - going on for years!1

In the case of China and other trading partners, the Trump
administration claims that the United States has many nonreciprocal
tariffs (i.e., the US tariff for goods imported from China is lower than
the corresponding Chinese tariff for the same goods imported from the
United States).' 8 ' The administration often points to automobiles as a
particularly egregious example of this unfairness and evidence of
China profiting from an unfair trade deal at the expense of the United
States.' 8 2

government-programs-including-medicaid/ [https://perma.cc/RVY6-H4GT] (archived
Nov. 5, 2018).
178. See Eduardo Porter, America's Aversion to Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/15/business/economy/slipping-behind-because-of-anaversion-to-taxes.html [https://perma.cclW6BS-5NLJ] (archived Nov. 5, 2018).
179. See Colin Grabow, The Trouble with Trump's Tariff Reciprocity, CATO INST.
(Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/against-reciprocal-tariffs
[https:/perma.cc/242E-EXBK] (archived Nov. 6, 2018) (criticizing Trump's view that
tariffs must be reciprocal to be fair).
180. Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 10, 2018, 3:03 AM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/983284198046826496
[https://perma.cc/K8QP-BF3S] (archived Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Apr. 2018 Tweet].
181. See Paul Bedard, China trade tariffs more than 2X higher than US, WASH.
23, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/washingtonEXAMINER (Mar.
secrets/china-trade-tariffs-more-than-2x-higher-than-us [https://perma.cc/AS72-7GHNI
(archived Nov. 8, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JA9E-9BHBI (archived Nov. 6, 2018) (China
"imposes tariffs more than twice as high as the United States").
182. See id.
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A. Tariffs under the WTO
Under the modern global trading system established by the WTO,
most nations continue to use tariffs as part of trade policy.' 8 3 Tariffs
are customs duties or taxes imposed by customs authorities on imports
at a port of entry and must be paid before the goods can enter the
internal market.1 84 Most tariffs today are ad valorem tariffs (i.e.,
expressed as a percentage of the value of the import),' 8 5 although other
types of tariffs are also sometimes used alone or in combination with
ad valorem tariffs.1 86 The United States and all other members of the
WTO have voluntarily adopted a system of classification of imports for
tariff purposes that conform to the International Convention on the
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System of 1988
(Harmonized Convention) drafted by the World Customs Council,
which works closely with the WTO.' 87 The Harmonized Convention is
a classification system based on ninety-seven chapters covering all
goods.' 8 8 Chapters are designated by a two-digit number appearing at
the beginning of the classification.18 9 The higher the chapter number,
the more complex and industrialized the import, and the lower the
number, the simpler and closer to nature will be the product. 9 0 The
two-digit chapter number is followed by a four-digit number indicating
subheadings for goods within the chapter.' 9 ' All WTO members have
agreed to adopt the Harmonized Convention up to the six-digit level,
with many countries assessing the tariff at the six-digit level.1 92 The

&

183. All WTO members maintain tariff schedules filed with the WTO. See
Current Situation of Schedules of WTO Members, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/schedules-e/goodsschedulestablee.htm
[https://perma.cc/G5U8-PNC6] (archived Nov. 9, 2018).
184. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 18, at 199.
185. See id. at 200.
186. See id. Another common type of tariff is a tariff rate quote (TRQ) in which a
lower tariff is charged for imports up to a certain limit (the "in quota" amount) and a
higher tariff for imports above the limit (the "out of quota" amount). See id. TRQs are
commonly used in US trade policy. Are My Goods Subject to Quota?, U.S. CUSTOMS
BORDER PROT. (July 19, 2018), https://www.cbp.gov/trade/quota/quota-restrict
[https://perma.cc/9A24-JDKX] (archived Nov. 7, 2018) (indicating that many US free
trade agreements establish TRQs).
187. See CHOW & SCHOENBAUM, supra note 20, at 137.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. at 137.
192. See id. at 138. The United States uses a ten-digit system. The tariff is
assessed at the eight-digit level, called the tariff line. The ten-digit number is used for
information gathering purposes only. The US six-digit number is the same as that used
by all other WTO members. See id. at 128. In order to make a final assessment of the
tariff, the United States will determine the country of origin of the product. Different
rates for the same good apply depending upon whether the country of origin is a
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United States has implemented the Harmonized Convention as the
193
Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (HTSUS).
This remarkable level of harmonization of tariff codes means that
it has now become a straightforward matter to compare tariff rates for
all imports across all WTO countries. To determine whether tariffs are
reciprocal, it is a simple matter of finding a tariff classification at the
six-digit level within the tariff schedule of each nation and then
examining the tariff rate associated with the six-digit classification.
The harmonization of national tariff schedules for all WTO countries
makes it easy for the Trump administration to argue that tariffs must
be reciprocal because it is relatively easy and straightforward to
compare tariffs for the same product across all countries.
The position of the Trump administration appears to be that
previously, US administrations have entered into unfair agreements
with their trading partners by agreeing to tariff schedules with new
members, such as China, that are nonreciprocal. 194 Moreover,
according to the Trump administration, the United States is the losing
party in the nonreciprocal tariff agreements and, as a result, is
suffering trade losses that contribute to the US trade deficit with China
and other trading partners. 195 To correct this problem, the United
States must renegotiate tariff schedules with its trading partners and
implement strictly reciprocal tariff schedules.
B. Nonreciprocal Tariffs and Trade Losses
The argument by the Trump administration on reciprocal tariffs
seems to imply that the United States and China engaged in a bilateral
negotiation over tariffs and that the United States unwisely accepted
an unfair agreement concerning tariffs with China. In practice,
however, the process of tariff negotiations under the GATT/WTO is
more complex.
Since both the United States and China are members of the WTO,
their tariff schedules were negotiated under the auspices of the
GATTIWTO. The United States was a founding member of the GATT
and its tariff schedule was established in 1947 with the inception of the

member of the WTO, has a trade treaty with the United States, or is neither a WTO
member nor a US treaty partner. See id.
193. See id. at 137.
194. See Apr. 2018 Tweet, supra note 180.
195. See id. Trump also claimed that Japan having tariff rates that are higher
than US rates as evidence of the United States being harmed by Japan. See Grabow,
supra note 179.
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GATT. 196 China did not become a member of the GATT/WTO until
2001.197 Under WTO procedures, when a new member seeks to join the
GATT/WTO, it must submit a formal written request for accession.19 8
The process of access is essentially a back-and-forth negotiation
process between the applicant and existing WTO members.1 9 9 As part
of this process, the applicant engages in bilateral negotiations (i.e.,
bargaining on a one-to-one basis) with any WTO member interested in
such bilateral talks.2 00 In the bilateral negotiation, the applicant and
existing WTO members must reach agreement on market access
commitments20 1 (i.e., tariff schedules). 202 Under this process, China's
proposed tariff schedule was made available for all interested WTO
members who had the opportunity to raise objections; similarly, China
had the opportunity to ask for tariff concessions from existing WTO
members as the process of accession was essentially a negotiation
process concerning a number of issues, including tariffs.2 03 This backand-forth process is a lengthy negotiation that continues until the new
member and all existing members are in agreement. The tariff
schedule of the new member and any revisions in the schedules of all
existing members then become effective legal WTO obligations of all
members. 204 All members are required by the GATT/WTO to impose
tariffs that do not exceed the rates set forth in the agreed-upon tariff
schedules.2 0 5

196. GATT, supra note 18, art. XXXIII (addressing the accession process). For a
general overview of how the GATT came to be, see generally DOUGLAS IRWIN ET AL.,
THE GENESIS OF THE GATT (2008).
197. Press Release, World Trade Org., WTO Successfully Concludes Negotiations
on China's Entry (Sept. 17, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/news-e/pres0le/
pr243-e.htm [https://perma.ccl5DSG-H5JWI (archived Nov. 6, 2018).
198. See How to become a member of the WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/english/thewtoe/acce/accese.htm [https://perma.cc/C2XH-WR3Q] (archived
Nov. 6, 2018) [hereinafter WTO Member].
199. See id.
200. See id. ("At the same time, the applicant government engages in bilateral
negotiations with interested Working Party members.").
201. See id.
202. See Market access for goods, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/markacc e/markacce.htm
[https://perma.cc/54G6-Q7U5]
(archived
Nov. 6, 2018) (noting that market access for goods in the WTO includes "tariff
commitments . . . set out in each member's schedules of concessions on goods").
203. See WTO Member, supra note 198.
204. See GATT, supranote 18, arts. I:1(a) & (b).
205. Id. Tariffs are "bound" under the GATT, meaning that WTO members have
agreed on ceilings on tariffs and WTO members cannot impose tariffs above the
ceilings. GATT states in relevant part: "The products described in Part I of the
Schedule relating to any contracting party, which are the products of territories of
other contracting parties, shall, on their importation into the territory to which the
Schedule relates, and subject to the terms, conditions or qualifications set forth in that
Schedule, be exempt from ordinary customs duties in excess of those set forth and
provided therein." (emphasis added). Id. art. II:1(b).
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C. Reciprocity and the GATT/WTO
The administration's focus on reciprocity is based on its
misunderstanding of exactly how the GATT/WTO has functioned
historically and of the economic logic employed by the bodies.
"GATT/WTO has established a rules-based system for world trade
based on a set of principles enshrined in the GATT Articles, along with
a dispute settlement system, that have been universally accepted and
respected by its members." 206 Membership has grown from the twentythree countries that signed the GATT in 1947 to 164 countries today. 2 07
Currently, WTO members account for more than 95 percent of both
global trade and GDP. 208 Over the seventy years of its existence, the
GATT/WTO has witnessed eight rounds of trade negotiations,
resulting in average industrial tariffs being reduced to less than 4
percent, 20 9 although it should be noted that there is quite a bit of
variation in the average level of MFN-applied tariffs across both
10
countries and sectors. 2
GATT/WTO has worked due to the application of two key
211
and
reciprocity
countries:
member
by
principles
nondiscrimination. 2 12 Importantly, though, the approach to reciprocity
applied by the GATT/WTO in successive rounds of trade negotiation is
not the same as that touted by the Trump administration. The
GATT/WTO allows for what is termed first-difference (marginal)
reciprocity, where trade negotiations focus on balancing concessions on
tariffs given an initial set of conditions. 213 By contrast, the
administration seeks full (level/mirror image) reciprocity in trade

206. Ian M. Sheldon, Daniel C.K. Chow & William McGuire, Trade Liberalization
and Institutional Constraints on Moves to Protectionism: Multilateralism vs.
Regionalism (Dec. 2017) (unpublished paper presented at 2018 Allied Social Sciences
Association Annual Meeting) [hereinafter Sheldon Trade] (citing Richard Baldwin, The
World Trade Organizationand the Future of Multilateralism, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 95,
95-116 (2016)).
207. See ANGELO PRESENZA & LORI R. SHEEHAN, GEOPOLITICS AND STRATEGIC
MANAGEMENT IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 3 (2018).
208. See PETER J. WILLIAMS, WORLD TRADE ORG., A HANDBOOK ON ACCESSION TO

THE WTO 2 (2008), http://bkp-development.com/et-tcbu-does/7/Willams%20%20Handbook%20on%2OAccession%20to%20the%20WTO%20%5B2008%5D.pdf
[https://perma.cc/95EP-ZNET] (archived Dec. 2, 2018).
209. See ANWARUL HODA, TARIFF NEGOTIATIONS AND RENEGOTIATIONS UNDER
THE GATT AND THE WTO: PROCEDURES AND PRACTICES 53, 70-71 (2001).

210. See Kyle Bagwell et al., Is the WTO Passd?, 54 J. ECON. LIT. 1125, 1131 (2016).
211. GATT, supra note 18, art. IV (c). This type of reciprocity is made possible by
the negotiation process described infra in Part IV.C.
212. For a discussion of WTO nondiscrimination principles, see sources cited
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
213.

See BERGSTEN, supra note 146.
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negotiations. 214 The latter approach is very straightforward-the
United States currently applies a 2.5 percent tariff on imported
automobiles, while the EU and China apply 10 percent and 25 percent
tariffs, respectively. 215 This is considered discriminatory, and,
therefore, both the EU and China should reduce their automobile
tariffs to the same level as that in the United States. This approach to
reciprocity is highly sectoral, but it ignores the dynamics of trade
liberalization. Specifically, why would policymakers in one country
agree to cut tariffs in a specific sector by more than what is politically

feasible?
Richard Baldwin describes a dynamic process where policymakers
trade off increased access to their own markets through tariff cuts in
exchange for access to export markets (i.e., the concerns of those
lobbying for the import-competing sectors are balanced by those
lobbying for the export-competing sectors). 216 In other words,
negotiations in the GATT/WTO have proceeded on the basis that there
will be a balance of trade concessions between member countries,
measured in terms of increased market access, but in the final deal,
each member country continues to protect a set of politically sensitive
sectors that will likely differ across countries. 2 17 Therefore, seeking full
reciprocity ignores the political reality of trade negotiations. By
contrast, first-difference reciprocity recognizes that if the United
States seeks a lower tariff on its exports of automobiles to China it can
offer to lower the US tariff on imports of footwear, a deal that works if
there is a commensurate increase in each country's export market
share. 218 Economic losses in the US footwear sector are balanced by
economic gains in the automobile sector, or, quoting from The
Economist, "Trade liberalization is a sort of jujitsu that uses exporter's
determination to get into foreign markets to overwhelm domestic
lobbies that would sooner keep home markets closed." 2 19
So why has first-difference reciprocity worked in the GATT/WTO?
"Orthodox trade theory suggests that a small country will unilaterally
cut its tariffs, the gains from trade through specialization and
exchange subsequently maximizing national income." 220 This is not

214. Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 11.
215. Donald Trump insists on trade reciprocity. But what kind?, THE EcoNOMIST
(July 12, 2018), https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2018/07/12/donaldtrump-insists-on-trade-reciprocity.-but-what-kind [https://perma.cc/45ZX-G7PD]
(archived Nov. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Trump trade reciprocity].
216. See Richard E. Baldwin, MultilateralizingRegionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as
BuildingBlocs on the Path to Free Trade, 29 WORLD ECON. 1451, 1459-71 (2006).
217. See Trump trade reciprocity, supra note 215.
218. See id.
219. See The future of globalisation,The ECONOMIST (July 27, 2006),
https://www.economist.com/1eaders/2006/07/27/the-future-of-globalisation
[https://perma.cc/ETD3-3AUY (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
220. Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 4.

2019]

STRICT RECIPROCITY

35

necessarily the case if a country, such as the United States, is large
enough to influence the price of its imports relative to the price of its
exports (i.e., its international terms of trade), or if public policy is
influenced by government preferences other than maximization of
national income. In other words, economic analysis of GATT/WTO is
about seeking a logical explanation for why a powerful country, such
as the United States, would seek to be part of such a trade agreement,
22 1
despite these unilateral incentives to raise tariffs.
In order to answer the first question, the seminal economic
approach of Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger to modeling GATT/WTO
is outlined. 222 The workhorse model for their approach is a simple twogood, two-country model, where one country (home) has a comparative
advantage in producing one good, and a second country (foreign) has a
22 3
There are two
comparative advantage in producing a second good.

important price relationships in this setting: local relative prices of
goods in the home and foreign countries, respectively, and world
relative prices of goods. In the absence of home and foreign tariffs, local
and world relative prices are exactly the same (i.e., markets are fully
integrated). 224 If each country sets a tariff on the good it imports from
the other country, it drives a wedge between its local and world relative
prices, giving protection to its import-competing sector by raising the
price of imports compared to local products; at the same time, each
country is large enough to be able to improve its terms of trade through
a tariff (i.e., it is large enough to be able to drive down the world
relative price of its imported good). 2 25 Given that local prices determine
the level and distribution of incomes earned by factors of production
(labor and capital) in each country, various government preferences
discussed in the political economy literature can be implemented,
including national income maximization and political lobbying

221. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, An Economic Theory of GATT, 89 AM.
ECON. REv. 215, 215-216 (1999).
222. See id. at 226-27.
223. See id. at 219; Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 4. In this simple model, there
are only two goods, x and y, in the world economy, where the home country is relatively
efficient at producing good y, which it exports in exchange for good x, which the foreign
country is relatively efficient at producing and exporting. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra
note 221, at 219.
224. See Bagwell & Staiger, supranote 221, at 219; Sheldon Trade, supranote 206,
at 4. Relative prices are given by the ratio of the price of good x to the price of good y.
This ratio exists in each country's local market as well as on the world market. If there
are no barriers to trade between the two countries, local and world price ratios are equal
to each other. If a country implements a tariff, the local price ratio will then be different
to the world price ratio. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 219.
225. See Bagwell & Staiger, supranote 221, at 220; Sheldon Trade, supranote 206,
at 4. A country's terms of trade are given by the world price ratio, an improvement in its
terms of trade being measured as a fall in the price of the good that it imports. See
Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 220.
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models. 226 It is also assumed that holding its local relative price fixed,
both home and foreign governments value an improvement in their
terms of trade. 2 27 Specifically, the fall in the world relative price of
their imported good results in a transfer of income from the foreign to
the home country. 22 8
If there is no trade agreement, the home and foreign countries
play out a noncooperative game in tariffs where each government
strikes a balance with respect to the local and world relative price
effects of its tariff choices.
In terms of local relative price changes, there is a trade-off between the political
benefits of redistribution to factors [of production] employed in the importcompeting sector and any deadweight losses to domestic consumers. With respect
to world relative price changes, the improvement in one country's terms-of-trade
necessarily results in a worsening of the other country's terms-of-trade, i.e., each
229
country shifts some of the costs of [its] protection onto the other country.

For example, the home country, in using a tariff to drive down the
relative price of its imported good, necessarily worsens the terms of
trade of the foreign country who exports that same good.
Essentially, it is the cost-shifting externality that results in the
noncooperative
equilibrium tariffs being inefficient. "[E]ach
government would like to lower [its] respective tariffs in order to
reduce the domestic distortion and generate more trade, but if done
unilaterally [each nation suffers] a worsening of its terms of trade." 230
The key insight by Professors Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger is that
if the terms-of-trade externality can be neutralized, it will be beneficial
for both countries to lower their tariffs.2 3 1 In other words, suppose that
neither country's government cared about terms-of-trade effects; tariffs
will be set to satisfy domestic political objectives alone. 232 "These
tariffs are termed 'politically-optimal tariffs,' which would either be
zero if each government seeks to maximize national income through
free trade, or they would be positive in order to satisfy domestic

226. See Harry G. Johnson, Optimum Tariffs and Retaliation, 21 REV. EcoN.
STUD. 142, 142-53 (1953); see also Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Protection
for Sale, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 833, 833-50 (1994); Wolfgang Mayer, Theoretical
Considerationson Negotiated Tariff Adjustments, 33 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 135, 136
(1981).
227. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 221.
228. See id. at 221; Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 4. The transfer of income
comes about due to an increase in tariff revenue, i.e., the importer pays a lower price for
the imported good on the world market, but the local price of that good increases as a
result of the tariff. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 221.
229. Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 6.
230. Id. at 6.
231. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 226-27.
232. See id. at 222-23.
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political-lobbying constraints," 2 3 3 such as the protection of domestic
sectors, but importantly, they are lower than those in a noncooperative
game. 234 Therefore, if countries enter into a trade agreement, they will
seek mutual reductions in tariffs generating an increase in national
economic welfare.
Given this model structure, the application of the principle of
reciprocity in GATT/WTO does result in tariff reductions that raise
economic welfare. Specifically, first-difference reciprocity means that
for either country to offer a tariff concession, it requires a tariff
concession from the other country such that the world relative prices
remain unchanged (i.e., terms-of-trade effects are ruled out). Tariffcutting continues until one of two conditions is satisfied: either one
country's government achieves its preferred local relative price before
the other country, or "politically-optimal tariffs" are achieved. Of
course, the idea that trade negotiators are concerned with the
technicality of terms-of-trade effects is likely unrealistic, but this
concept can be expressed in terms of market access. A tariff, while
creating a terms-of-trade benefit for the importing country, also results
in a loss of market share for the exporting country. In other words,
from a practical standpoint, trade negotiations are about mutual
concessions on market access, taking account of domestic political
constraints. 235
As well as first-difference reciprocity, the principle of
nondiscrimination in GATTIWTO also requires that tariffs be applied
on a nondiscriminatory MFN basis; 236 in other words, in the simple
model, if the home and foreign country agree to lower their tariffs,
those tariff cuts should be extended by each of those countries to any
other country that is a member of GATT/WTO. 237 Importantly, MFN
in combination with reciprocity can minimize the risk of third-country
spillovers. 238 Suppose the home country exports its good to two foreign
countries, and imports the other good from both countries, and it
chooses to enter into reciprocal tariff reduction with foreign country 1,
but both the home and foreign country 1 offer their respective tariff

233. See id. at 221; Sheldon Trade, supra note 206, at 6. This is getting at the idea
that even if there is no benefit from manipulating its terms of trade, a country's
government may still set tariff(s) to achieve its domestic political objectives.
234. See Bagwell & Staiger, supra note 221, at 222-24.
235. See id. at 216.
236. See GATT, supra note 18, art. I (establishing the MFN principle). See also
sources cited supra notes 17-20.
237. See GATT, supra note 18, art. I. This result is required by MFN, which
provides that WTO members must extend trade benefits given to any country to all

other WTO members. The effect of MFN is to multiply and universalize trade benefits
for all WTO members.
238. See Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, The World Trade Organization:Theory
and Practice, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 223, 245 (2010) [hereinafter Bagwell & Staiger WTO].
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cuts to foreign country 2 under MFN. The end result is that if foreign
country 2 keeps its tariff fixed, negotiations between the home and
foreign country 1 under MFN ensure that there is a single world
relative price that remains unchanged (i.e., foreign country 2
experiences no change in its export volume). It should be noted though,
that without reciprocal tariff cuts by the home and foreign country 1,
the world relative price will change, thereby affecting foreign country
2's export trade volume-in other words, MFN on its own is not
sufficient to prevent concession erosion. 239 Both MFN and firstdifference reciprocity are required to maintain stable world relative
prices. This entirely contradicts the claim of Commerce Secretary
Wilbur Ross who has argued that MFN is a "significant impediment
toward getting to anything like a reciprocal agreement." 240

V. JUSTIFICATION

FOR

US

TRADE SANCTIONS

The analysis set forth above challenges the three basic
assumptions of US economic nationalism in its current incarnation as
espoused by the Trump administration. Underlying US economic
nationalism is a concept of strict reciprocity in both the trade flows and
in tariff schedules as part of a zero-sum game. Although the concept of
reciprocity has the virtue of simplicity, it is in fact an
oversimplification and is grounded on a basic misunderstanding of
international economics and trade policy. An examination of these
concepts indicates that trade is far more nuanced and sophisticated
than the view espoused by US economic nationalism. Reciprocity is an
element of free trade, but it is marginal or first-difference reciprocity,
not absolute reciprocity. If these assumptions are fallacious, what then
are the consequences for US economic nationalism and the Trump
administration?
The first consequence is that the United States is no longer
justified in maintaining its current trade sanctions. The Trump
administration relies on these assumptions and the unfairness in trade
that they demonstrate to justify trade sanctions. The reasoning is that
if strict reciprocity is required for fair trade and there is a lack of
reciprocity in current US trade agreements, then these agreements are
unfair, and the United States is justified in imposing tariffs on its
trading partners to remedy the unfairness. If strict reciprocity is not a
condition of fair trade, then the Trump administration has not proven

239. See id. at 246.
240. See Chad. P. Bown & Alan 0. Sykes, The Trump Trade Team's Vocabulary
Problem, WALL ST. J. (May 14, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-trump-tradeteams-vocabulary-problem-1494795625 [https://perma.cclPPQ3-6MYC] (archived Dec.
2, 2018).
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that trade is unfair, and the United States loses its justification for the
tariffs. From a normative standpoint, the United States must supply
an alternative, valid justification or withdraw the tariffs.
The Trump administration's reliance on strict reciprocity in trade
is one explanation why the United States is not pursuing a remedy
through the WTO. 241 The GATT/WTO does not recognize strict
reciprocity as a fundamental condition of free trade. 242 The
GATT/WTO does allow for marginal or first-difference reciprocity, but
this is a nuanced version of reciprocity, not the absolute reciprocity
espoused by the Trump administration. 24 3 As foundational principles,
the GATT/WTO relies on National Treatment 244 and MFN, a principle
of nondiscrimination that is designed to multiply trade benefits to the
entire WTO membership. 245 MFN is based on a positive-sum game
view of trade. 246 The US position of strict reciprocity, based on a zerosum view of trade, is not a rule or norm recognized in the WTO and
does not provide a basis for the United States to challenge trade
agreements entered into under WTO auspices. 2 47 If the United States
were able to assert that existing trade agreements violated MFN, then
the United States would have a cognizable claim under the WTO and
the United States might bring actions within the WTO to challenge
existing trade arrangements. 248 Without this option, the United States
has decided to act outside of the WTO on a unilateral basis, which has
the additional harmful effect of undermining the authority and
relevance of the WTO.

249

241. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 18, at 83-86. The WTO has a
dispute settlement system under which WTO members can file a complaint against
other members who have breached their WTO obligations. See id. The key is that the
obligation must be one that is recognized by the WTO. See id. at 91-105. As strict
reciprocity is not a WTO obligation, it does not provide the basis for a case in the WTO.
In order to bring a case in the WTO, a complainant must allege the "nullification or
impairment" of a benefit under the WTO agreements. See GATT, supra note 18, art.
XXIII . As there is no provision in any of the WTO agreements creating a strict
reciprocity obligation, there is no basis for arguing that denying strict reciprocity
nullifies or impairs a benefit under the WTO. See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra

note 18, at 91-105.
242. See id. at 149. The foundational principles of the WTO are MFN and National
Treatment, contained in GATT Article I and Article III respectively. Id. Nothing in the
GATT mentions reciprocity in trade at all. See generally GATT, supra note 18.
243. See supra Part IV.C.
244. See id.
245.

See INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, supra note 18.

246. See id.
247. See id.
248. See id. at 91 (noting that a violation of a WTO trade agreement would be a
"violation" case that involves the "nullification and impairment" of a WTO obligation and
cognizable in the WTO).
249. See Unilateralism,supra note 1, at Part IV.
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A second consequence of the analysis in this Article is that US
economic nationalism could actually have the unintended long-term
effect of harming US interests. If the large body of empirical and
theoretical work is correct that the GATT/WTO has led to trade
liberalization, increased trade volumes, and higher incomes on a global
basis and for nations individually, then a rejection of this approach in
favor of economic nationalism might be harmful to global trade and
economic welfare.2 5 0 The economic logic of the GATT/WTO should
continue to further expand international trade; US economic
nationalism could derail this progress or result in complete collapse of
the system if US tactics lead to retaliation and a trade war.
A third consequence is that the current approach distracts the
United States from addressing serious problems in international trade.
For example, while Trump's criticism of China seems to be based on
false assumptions, there can be little doubt that China has caused
serious problems in international trade. There is widespread
agreement among virtually all different constituencies and political
affiliations in the United States that China is a serious disrupter of
trade. 25 1 Moreover, there is nearly unanimous agreement among many
nations in addition to the United States that China engages in theft of
intellectual property and that China provides illegal government
subsidies that supply a financial advantage to its state-owned
companies. 252 Not only is China causing serious distortions in
international trade, China is also boldly challenging the United States
for economic supremacy in all areas in the twenty-first century. 253
These are serious challenges that require a thoughtful, sophisticated,
and measured response. 254 Instead, the Trump administration's
current response, based on dubious economic assumptions, is a blunt,
"get tough" approach that unilaterally imposes punitive tariffs in an

250. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Ian Sheldon & William McGuire, The
Revival of Economic Nationalism and the Global Trading System, 441 CARDOZO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2019).
251. See Greg Ip, China Started the Trump War, Not Trump,.WALL. ST. J. (Mar.
23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-started-the-trade-war-not-trump1521797401 [https://perma.cc/9JAC-KDP6] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
252. See, e.g., Requests for Consultations by the European Union, ChinaCertainMeasures on the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1 (June 6, 2018);
Requests for Consultations by the European Union, China-MeasuresAffecting
FinancialInformation Services and ForeignFinancialInformation Suppliers, WTO
Doc. WT/DS372/1 (Mar. 3, 2018); Requests for Consultations by the Republic of Mexico,
China-Grants,Loans and Other Incentives, WTO Doc. WT/DS388/1 (Dec. 19, 2008).
253. See generally Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Established the Asia
InfrastructureInvestment Bank, 49 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1255 (2017) (discussing
how China is challenging the United States' dominance of international lending
through the World Bank).
254. See Thomas J. Schoenbaum & Daniel C.K. Chow, The Perilsof Economic
Nationalism and a ProposedPath to Trade Harmony, STAN. L. & POL'Y REV.
(forthcoming 2019) (proposing a general strategy directed at containing China).
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attempt to intimidate China. 255 But while these bullying tactics might
have been effective in the past, 256 it is unclear that they can contain an
increasingly confident and economically powerful China, which has
responded to US attempts at intimidation with anger, ridicule, and
contempt. 257 Instead, these tactics might backfire and lead to a
destructive trade war.

VI. CONCLUSION

The arguments by the Trump administration that strict
reciprocity is required for fair trade have a superficial and intuitive
appeal that struck a nerve among important groups of US voters and
helped to propel Donald J. Trump to the US presidency. Yet these
arguments, based upon three assumptions analyzed in this Article,
only have a thin veneer of logic that quickly dissipates under scrutiny.
First, unlike the Trump administration, the majority of
economists do not view trade as a zero-sum game with one winner and
one loser in every bilateral trade relationship; rather, a large body of
literature supports the opposite view that both sides in a bilateral
trade relationship can benefit and that on a multilateral level, under
the right conditions, trade can be beneficial to many nations without
harming others.

255.

See Chinese state media slams latest US tariff call as "ridiculous"attempt at

intimidation, REUTERS (Apr. 5 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usa-trade-china-

state-media/chinese-state-media-slams-latest-us-tariff-call-as-ridiculous-attempt-atintimidation-idUSL4N1RJOO2 [https://perma.cclCJ4D-CPCU] (archived Nov. 7, 2018)
("This latest intimidation reflects the deep arrogance of some American elites in their
attitude towards China"). Of course, making bold statements in the press is not the
same as being willing to endure a trade war with the United States. Nonetheless, the
authors believe that in the past, a less confident China would not have publicly made
such aggressive assertions.
256. See id. Before China joined the WTO, China had to undergo an annual
review by the U.S. Congress of its record on human rights in order to receive the MFN
tariff rates that the United States extended to all WTO members. See Daniel C.K.
Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in the World Trade Organization, 35 U.
PENN. J. INT'L L. 61, 79-80 (2014). China had to suffer the humiliation of US lectures
on its poor human rights records in stoic silence, but ultimately China would receive
congressional approval every year. See id. With the accession of China to the WTO,
China obtained MFN tariffs as a matter of right and so no longer needed annual
congressional approval. See Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Opposes Human Rights in
the World Trade Organization, 35 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 61, 80 (2014). However, China has
never forgotten this annual rite of humiliation and has viewed it as a matter of
national dignity to stand up to US bullying. See Fred Imbert, China Says it Must
Retaliate Against Tariffs 'To Defend the Nation's Dignity,' CNBC (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/china-says-it-must-retaliate-to-defend-nationsdignity.html [https://perma.cclZT6H-3W86] (archived Nov. 8, 2018).
257. See id.
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Second, the US position that a trade deficit is a direct economic
loss to the nation incurring the deficit and a direct gain to the nation
enjoying the surplus is also subject to the same criticism. This
argument also falls into the trap of specious arguments with a surface
appeal. Trade deficits are the result of complex macroeconomic policies
that cannot be corrected by the simple application of tariffs on imports
from China and other countries such as those currently being used by
the United States.
Third, the argument that US and foreign nation tariffs on the
same good must be identical, mirror images of each other is based on a
misunderstanding of the lengthy negotiation process that nations
undergo in the WTO to reach mutually acceptable tariff schedules.
Tariff schedules are complex instruments and reflect an agreement on
an overall package of concessions in which higher tariff rates on some
goods may be offset by lower tariff rates on others.
What appears to be common in all of the arguments by the Trump
administration is that they have the most appeal to a less sophisticated
audience that is eager, and perhaps predisposed, to embrace them.
While the use of these arguments may display the considerable
political acumen needed to win popular elections and attain power,
these same arguments must still withstand critical examination if they
are to serve as the basis for the exercise of that power, once obtained,
in the form of an aggressive US trade policy used against US trading
partners, both friendly and less so. The results of this scrutiny, as set
forth in this Article, is that these arguments quickly implode once we
look beneath the surface.
Not only is strict reciprocity not necessary for fair trade, but
insisting on it is harmful to achieving harmony in trade. As the Trump
administration's current trade policy of imposing punitive tariffs is
based upon these erroneous concepts, its current trade policy is also
flawed and must be corrected.

